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EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR TRANSACTIONS' IN SEX CRIME
PROSECUTIONS; A NEW TREND TOWARD LIBERAL
ADMISSIBILITY
I
Perhaps no other rule of criminal evidence is better established
in this country than that which states-: Evidence that the accused
has committed transactions of a similar nature but unrelated to the
crime charged is inadmissible. 2 This rule is grounded upon a premise
fundamental to the Anglo-American concept of justice: that a de-
fendant should be tried solely for the crime specifically charged
against him. 3 The rule has been subjected to many exceptions, sug-
gesting that the exceptions now constitute the rule. Under standard
exceptions, evidence of similar transactions is admitted where
relevant to certain material elements of the crime in issue, 4 for
example to establish the identity or to show the motive or intent
of the perpetrator. "Standard exception" is merely a convenient
label attached to those exceptions to the inadmissibility rule which,
through frequent usage and passage of time, have gained universal
acceptance. These standard exceptions allow admission of trans-
actions: (1) to show intent, motive, absence of mistake or accident,5
(2) to prove a plan, scheme, design, technique, (3) to establish the
identity of the perpetrator of the crime in issue7 (4) to show
capacity to do the act,' (5) to complete the res gestae,9 and for
combinations of these. In addition to these standard exceptions, new
exceptions have been invented to meet the exigencies of particular
situations in which evidence of other transactions was relevant to a
1. While court opinions dealing with this type of evidence usually refer
to similar "crimes" or "offenses," for the sake of uniformity and neutrality
of meaning the word "transaction" will be used in this discussion.
2. 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 232 (12th ed. 1955).
3. Keene v. Commonwealth, 307 Ky. 308, 312, 210 S. W. 2d 926, 928
(1948) (dictum).
4. See 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 233 (12th ed. 1955).
5. Fikes v. State, 81 So. 2d 303 (Ala. 1955); State v. Simpson, 243
Iowa 65, 71-72, 50 N. W. 2d 601, 604 (1951) (dictum) ; State v. Bradford,
362 Mo. 226, 240 S. XW. 2d 930 (1951).
6. See, e.g., People v. Bennett, 287 P. 2d 866 (Cal. App. 1955) ; Allen
v. State, 201 Ga. 391, 40 S. E. 2d 144 (1946) ; State v. DePauw, 74 N. W.
2d 297 (Minn. 1955).
7. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 204 Ga. 345, 49 S. E. 2d 886 (1948)
Turner v. State, 187 Tenn. 309, 213 S. W. 2d 281 (1948).
8. Commonwealth v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 669, 670, 75 N. E. 2d 241 (1947)
(dictum). The court there suggested that evidence of other transactions bear-
ing on capacity to do the act is relevant and admissible, but holds the evi-
dence introduced as not pertinent to capacity.
9. See State v. Martinez, 67 Ariz. 389, 198 P. 2d 115 (1948). There
the other transactions were inseparable from the crime charged, although
the court does not specifically call it res gestae.
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material issue but not admissible under one of the standard ex-
ceptions.10
An inexorable corollary of the inadmissibility rule is that no
evidence may be admitted to show a propensity on the part of the
accused to perpetrate crimes in general or crimes of the type
charged, nor to illustrate wickedness or depravity.11 Recently,
however, courts have freely admitted evidence for precisely these
purposes in sexual offense cases. At first confined almost exclusively
to evidence of other transactions committed with or against the
same person, the trend of liberal admissibility has more recently
permitted inclusion of evidence of other transactions vith or against
persons other than the complainant.' An analysis of the application
of the inadmissibility rule to prosecutions for sexual offenses may
bring some of the problems in this area in focus, and alleviate con-
fusion. The scope of this discussion will be limited to situations in
which the alleged independent transactions were against or with
persons other than the complainant,13 since therein lies the latest
encroachment on the rule. No attention will be accorded to cases
in which the defendant failed to make timely objection to the admis-
sion, a usual prerequisite to raising the question of fundamental
error.14
II
A survey of recent sexual offense cases where the prosecution
sought to introduce evidence of independent transactions with or
against other persons reveals a strong trend toward relaxation of the
inadmissibility rule. Although the cases are not in complete agree-
10. See Note, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 608, 615 (1953) (dealing generally
with evidence of other crimes).
11. Lovely v. United States, 169 F. 2d 386, 388-89 (4th Cir. 1948)
(dictum) ; State v. Sauter, 125 Mont. 109, 116, 232 P. 2d 731, 734 (1951)
(dictum); Commonwealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super. 328, 340, 116 A. 2d
867, 872-73 (1955) (dictum).
The state may not initially attack the character of the accused nor may
it prove bad character by particular acts. 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 232
(12th ed. 1955). It has been suggested that a general denial of the charge
by the accused places his character in issue. Such a proposition, if logically
extended, would seem to-allow blanket admission of all independent trans-
actions.
12. It is not entirely accurate to use the expression "complainant' or
"complaining party" because the person with or against whom the offense
in issue has been committed does not always make the complaint.
13. In cases within the last ten years.
14. See People v. Scalamiero, 143 Cal. 343, 76 Pac. 1098 (1904) (excep-
tion must be made before objectionable question is answered); Bunn Y.
State, 85 Okla. Crim. 367, 190 P. 2d 464 (1947) (conviction affirmed because
of failure to object). But see Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Grim. 45. 230 P.
2d 495 (1951) (although no objection was interposed, the court refused to




ment, most courts do not exclude logically relevant circumstantial
evidence of other transactions merely because it tends to show that
the defendant is guilty of another crime.15 On the other hand, de-
spite the relaxation of the rule, many courts still exclude the evi-
dence where its probative value is insignificant compared to its
prejudicial effect.1"
Of the standard exceptions, the exception for evidence tending
to prove intent has been the most often employed in the class of
cases under discussion. Evidence of other transactions has been
introduced to negate innocent intent on the part of the accused"7
as well as to demonstrate an intent, for instance, to committee rape
rather than robbery upon accosting a woman on the street.18 Al-
though intent is supposedly an element to be proved in every act
which is a crime at common law,15 sexual offenses such as rape,
incest, and sodomy are crimes in which intent is inherent and can
be inferred from the nature of the act.20 Yet courts have admitted
evidence of similar transactions in trials for these ,offenses under
the intent exception,21 declining to infer intent from the nature of
the act.
Under the exception to show plan or scheme a group of related
acts of the same character may be introduced in order to establish a
probability that the defendant committed the one with which he is
charged.2 This exception ostensibly has been stretched when,
through judicial discretion to admit or exclude evidence, a plan or
scheme has been "inferred" from two ,or more entirely unrelated
acts.23 In one instance an act of indecent exposure at about the same
date was admitted to show a design or plan by the defendant to rape
his daughter.2 4 A prerequisite to admissibility under this exception
is that each act in the series definitely be traced to the accused.2 5 It
15. People v. Carmelo, 94 Cal. App. 2d 301, 304, 210 P. 2d 538, 540(1949) (dictum) ; Turner v. State, 187 Tenn. 309, 317, 213 S. W. 2d 281, 284
(1948) (dictum).
16. Harris v. State, 88 Okla. Crim. 422, 204 P. 2d 305 (1949) ; Day v.
Commonwealth, 196 Va. 907, 86 S. E. 2d 23 (1955).
17. See People v. Kinder, 122 Cal. App. 2d 457, 265 P. 2d 24 (1954).
18. McKenzie v. State, 250 Ala. 178, 180, 33 So. 2d 488, 490 (1947)
(dictum).
19. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 250-52 (1952).
20. See State v. Alexander, 216 La. 932, 45 So. 2d 83 (1950) ; Young v.
State, 159 Tex. Crim. 164, 165, 261 S. W. 2d 836, 837 (1953).
21. See Gerlach v. State, 217 Ark. 102, 229 S. W. 2d 37 (1950) ; People
v. Westek, 31 Cal. 2d 469, 190 P. 2d 9 (1948) ; People v. Bennett, 287 P. 2d
866 (Cal. App. 1955).
22. 2 Wiginore, Evidence § 304 (3d ed. 1940).
23. See Commonwealth v. Kline, 361 Pa. 434, 65 A. 2d 348 (1949).
24. Ibid.
25. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 304 (3d ed. 1940).
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is doubtful whether this requirement is always met in the principal
cases. On the theory that the likeness of the crime shown to have
been committed by the accused to the one in issue is probatively
relevant, several courts have stated that similar transactions with or
against persons other than the complaining party may be admitted
to illustrate a modus operandi. -6
In addition to the standard exceptions various others have been
employed to admit evidence of independent transactions in sexual
offense prosecutions. Some of these have been "invented" to cope
with a specific situation in which standard exceptions were inap-
plicable. A few are indistinguishable in substance from standard
exceptions. Evidence of other transactions has been admitted where
the courts have said it was pertinent to show the attitude of the
accused,27 his state of mind,28 a passion or emotion of the same
type; 29 to indicate a probability or the plausibility that the defendant
committed the act in question;30 to rebut an inference or defense
raised by the accused;31 to corroborate the prosecution or to explain
the act charged.3 2 Implicit in the application of- some of these is
the assumption that sexual offenders repeat their crimes.
In two states (California and Kansas), courts have openly ad-
mitted evidence to show a propensity to commit sex crimes 3  They
have emphasized the importance of the mental and emotional nature
of the accused as a factor tending to prove his commission of the
crime charged.3 4 Evidence of unrelated transactions has been ac-
cepted by these courts as demonstrative of the defendant's "levd,
lustful, or lascivious nature or disposition," and his "disposition or
tendency to commit the crime charged or crimes of that nature."33
26. See People -v. Sullivan, 101 Cal. App. 2d 322, 225 P. 2d 645 (1950);
Mosley v. State, 211 Ga. 611, 87 S. E. 2d 314 (1955).
27. See State v. Davis, 229 N. C. 386, 50 S. E. 2d 37 (1948).
28. See, e.g., Commonvealth v. Ransom, 169 Pa. Super. 306, 82 A. 2d
547 (1951), affd, 369 Pa. 153, 85 A. 2d 125 (1952) ; Dorsey v. State, 204 Ga.
345, 49 S. E. 2d 886 (1948). But see Day v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 907, 86
S. E. 2d 23 -(1955).
29. State v. Jackson, 82 Ohio App. 318, 321-22, 81 N. E. 2d 546, 548
(1948) (dictum).
30. See, e.g., People v. Herman, 97 Cal. App. 2d 272, 217 P. 2d 440
(1950) ; People v. Boyd, 95 Cal. App. 2d 831, 213 P. 2d 724 (1950).
31. See, e.g., People v. Carmelo, 94 Cal. App. 2d 301, 210 P. 2d 538
(1949) ; State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P. 2d 764 (1949).
32. Onstott v. State. 156 Neb. 55, 54 N. IV. 2d 380 (1952) ; State v.
Allen, 163 Kan. 374, 376, 183 P. 2d 458, 460 (1947) (dictum).
33. See, e.g., People v. Herman, 97 Cal. App. 2d 272, 217 P. 2d 440
(1950) ; State v. Whiting, 173 Kam 711, 252 P. 2d 884 (1953); State v.
Allen,. supra note 32. See also Dyson v. United States, 97 A.- 2d 135 (Mun.
Ct. App. D.C. 1953).
34. See note 33 .supra.
35. See note 33 supra.
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To ground an exception to the general inadmissibility rule on what
jurists believe to be fact-that the sex offender is a degenerate or at
least a person with a tendency to repeat his wrongful acts-is seem-
ingly to accomplish what the rule is intended to prevent. However,
rationalizing the admission of independent transactions under stand-
ard or other exceptions may merely be a more subtle method of
controverting the rule.
III
An integral part of the inadmissibility rule is the requirement
that, regardless of the exception under which proof of other trans-
actions is admitted, the evidence must be of sufficient probative force
to sustain a reasonable belief that the accused actually committed
them.36 Such a vague standard can easily be a weapon destructive
of justice in the hands of a judge who, not wholly oblivious to
public opinion, is caught up in the "war" against sex criminals.
Though difficult to ascertain from the fact situations in reported
cases, the standard of "reasonable belief" seems to have been
changed to "any belief" in some instances.3 7
Within the last ten years, evidence of other transactions has
been introduced in several ways in the cases under discussion. The
most common method of introducing evidence to show commission
of other transactions has been by direct testimony from persons
with or against whom the transactions were alleged to have been
perpetrated. Similarly, prosecutors have used statements from wit-
nesses to the transactions and testimony as to conversations with de-
fendants in which the other transactions were revealed."8 Formal
and informal confessions by the accused of the other transactions
have been alluded to in some cases.3 9
The most subtle means of offering this evidence has been by
inference. In one case, the prosecutrix testified that she had identi-
fied the defendant from police photographs. 40 In another, a witness
recounted that he had seen the defendant on a chain gang while
the defendant was serving a sentence for rape.41 In still a third case,
36. Sneed v. State, 143 Ark. 178, 219 S. W. 1019 (1920).
37. See People v. Pazell, 399 Ill. 462, 78 N. E. 2d 212 (1948). There,
after the trial court had admitted it, the appellate court refused to allow
evidence of other transactions, implying that there was no reasonable basis
for belief of their commission.
38. See State v. Pierce, 59 Ariz. 411, 129 P. 2d 916 (1942).
39. See Dyson v. United States, 97 A. 2d 135 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C.
1953) ; State v. Bradford, 362 Mo. 226, 240 S. W. 2d 930 (1951) ; Harris v.
State, 88 Okla. Crim. 422, 204 P. 2d 305 (1949) (evidence held inadmissable).
40. People v. Maffioli, 406 Ill. 315, 94 N. E. 2d 191 (1950).




the chief of police told of meeting the accused prior to the charged
statutory rape while investigating another statutory rape case.42 In-
troduction by inference or innuendo has also been accomplished
through questions directed to that end 3 and rebuttal evidence which
has fallen short of positively establishing another transaction.4"
Though appellate courts rarely fail to exclude evidence introduced
by.inference or innuendo,45 the greater frequency of introduction of
other transactions by tfiese means in the trial courts points up the
attempt by prosecuting attorneys further to liberalize the general
rule in sexual offenses or at least to take fullest advantage of the
present liberal trend to gain convictions.
A basic requirement under the exceptions to the general inad-
missibility rule is that the independent transactions admitted into
evidence be of a similar nature to the act in issue.'0 Proof of non-
sexual offenses perpetrated with or against others has not usually
been accepted in the principal cases except to complete the res
gestae,47 nor would it be logically relevant for any other purpose.
Although determination of the similarity or dissimilarity of
sexual acts is perhaps the function of the social scientist, some
offenses on their face can be rejected as unlike. It is fundamental
that homosexual acts are different than heterosexual acts and that
crimes of force and of sexual intercourse, such as rape are dis-
similar to those distinctly lacking aggression and absent intercourse,
such as indecent exposure and window peeping.48 Psychiatrists find
a demarcation line between sexual offenses against young girls and
those against post-puberty females.49 Nevertheless, courts have, on
occasion, failed to recognize these differences in admitting evidence
of other transactions."
42. Shearin v. State, 280 S. W. 2d 275 (Tex. Crim. 1955) (evidence
disallowed on appeal).
43. See State v. Dietz, 5 N. J. Super. 222, 68 A. 2d 777 (App. Div.
1949) (evidence disallowed on appeal).
44. See People v. Pazell, 399 Ill. 462, 469, 78 N. E. 2d 212, 215 (1948).
45. See, e.g., cases cited notes 43 and 49 supra. But see People v.
Maffioli, 406 IlL 315, 94 N. E. 2d 191 (1950).
46. This requirement is such an integral part of the exceptions to the
rule that it does 'not appear to have been stated independently of them.
Similarity of character is not required where the exception is to complete
the res gestae. 1 .Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 234 (12th ed. 1955).
47. See State v. Martinez, 67 Ariz. 389, 198 P. 2d 115 (1948).
48.\ See Piker, A Psychiatrist Looks at Sex Offenses, 33 J. Soc. Hyg.
392, 393 (1947). From information obtained February 20, 1956, in an inter-
view with Dr. Bernard C. Glueck, Jr., Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Uni-
versity of Minnesota, and former psychiatric consultant at Sing Sing Prison.
49. See Report of the New York State Sex Delinquency Research Con-
inittee (to be published by the New York Legislature).
50. See State v. Bradford, 362 Mo. 226, 240 S. V. 2d 930 (1951) ; Com-
monwealth v. KYline, 361 Pa. 434, 65 A. 2d 348 (1949).
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Generally, the other transactions to be introduced must be of a
criminal nature to be allowed into evidence. However, the borderline
between criminal conduct and acts of moral reprobation is not
always clear in sexual offense cases."1 In People v. Tolson, 5 2 the
character of the other transactions of the accused, charged with rape,
was merely offensive conduct toward several women which consisted
of a request that they go for a ride with him and the pinching of
the buttocks of one. The evidence was admitted.
Another prerequisite to the admission of proof of independent
transactions is that they must not be too remote in time to be of
evidentiary value.53 The test of remoteness rests within the discre-
tion of the trial judge and necessarily varies with the circumstances
of the individual case. Except for isolated cases, this requirement
has been adhered to in sexual offense prosecutions. 54
For a time, some courts did not admit evidence of other transac-
tions which were committed sebsequent to the crime being prose-
cuted. Recently, the test of admission of subsequent transactions has
been whether or not they were relevant to the crime in issue.55 This
appears to be a wiser course to follow, for it is difficult to understand
why more probative weight should be given to prior transactions
than to those occurring subsequent to the offense charged.
When evidence of other transactions is received as relevant
under one of the exceptions to the general inadmissibility rule, the
trial judge is expected properly to limit the scope of its use by direct-
ing an appropriate instruction to the jury. 50 However, failure to
give such an instruction has not been deemed to be error requiring
reversal, and where evidence has been introduced and then ruled
51. An attempt to show illicit relations with adult women, where the
accused was charged with rape of a young girl, was rejected as dissimilar.
See State v. Hayes, 356 Mo. 1033, 204 S. W. 2d 723 (1947).
Frequently, the other transaction sought to be admitted is merely a
violation of an ordinance or a sexual misdemeanor. See People v. Herman,
97 Cal. App. 2d 272, 217 P. 2d 440 (1950) (defendant photographed prosecutrix
in acts of sexual intercourse) ; Commonwealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super. 328,
116 A. 2d 867 (1955) (defendant allegedly showed a lewd picture to a young
girl).
52. 109 Cal. App. 2d 579, 241 P. 2d 32 (1952).
53. State v. Moubray, 81 S. E. 2d 117 (W.Va. 1954) ;' Melville, Evidence
as to Similar Offenses, Acts or Transactions in Criminal Cases, 29 Dicta 235
(1952). Perhaps, in fairness to the accused, just as any doubts as to relevancy
are resolved in his favor, so also should doubts as to remoteness in time be
resolved in his favor. Cf. Harris v. State, 88 Okla. Crim. 422, 204 P. 2d
305(1949) ; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 233 (12th ed. 1955).
54. See Melville, supra note 53 at 254.
55. See, e.g., Mosley v. State, 211 Ga. 611, 87 S. E. 2d 314 (1955);
Dorsey v. State, 204 Ga. 345, 49 S. E. 2d 886 (1948) ; State v. Bradford, 362
Mo. 226, 240 S. W. 2d 930 (1951).
56. Melville, supra note 53. For such an instruction see Commonwealth
v. Young, 172 Pa. Super. 102, 107-08, 92 A. 2d 445, 447-48 (1952).
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out, no case has been found where failure to give an instruction to
disregard the evidence has been held to be fundamental error. In
any event, the giving of these instructions can be little solace to a
defendant after evidence of independent transactions has been intro-
duced, for the effect of these instructions on a jury is at best negligi-
ble. "The human mind is not a slate, from which can be wiped out,
at the will and instruction of another, ideas and thoughts written
thereon."57
IV
Perhaps the reason courts have been slower to liberalize the in-
admissibility rule where the other transactions have been with or
against persons other than the complainant is that they have felt
sexual transactions between the same two persons justify a valid
inference of repetition while those between the defendant and other
persons do not. Evidence of similar transactions with or against
the identical person is accepted most often in sexual offenses based
on consent, such as incest, statutory rape, and adultery.5 8 A peculiar
desire and opportunity to commit the offense in issue is demon-
strated by proving another offense of this type with the same per-
son.51 Special desire to commit the crime in issue can also be shown,
with less force, by evidence of another consensual offense with a
person other than the complainant. It may be argued that even in
nonconsensual offenses, the distinction between transactions with or
against the same person and transactions with or against others
is warranted, since the former would tend to prove not only a desire
to commit the specific type of offense, but to commit it with a par-
ticular person.
The rationale behind the relaxation of the inadmissibility rule-
whether hidden, as in the contorted application of exceptions, or
patent, as where a disposition to commit crimes of the kind charged
is shown-is that sex offenders have a tendency to repeat their
acts.60 The validity of this rational is essential to the argument for
freer admissibility. Some psychiatric and sociological studies have
been interpreted as proving there is no greater and perhaps even
less recidivism among sexual offenders than among other crimi-
nals.6' One recent survey purports to establish that sexual offenders
perpetrating new crimes commit more nonsexual crimes than those
57. People v. Deal, 357 Ill. 634, 643, 192 N. E. 649, 652 (1934).
58. See 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 86, 89-90 (1952).
59. Id. at 90.
60. 39 Calif. L. Rev. 584, 587 (1951); 23 Temp. L. Q. 133, 134-35
(1949) ; see Commonwealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super. 328, 341-44, 116 A. Zd
867, 873-74 (1955).
61. rd. at 342-43 n. 2,116 A. 2d at 873 n. 2.
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of a sexual nature.02 These studies become subject to suspicion of
statistical bias and misinterpretation when it is observed for in-
stance, that they are frequently based on the number of convictions
obtained,63 a factor not always indicative of the number of offenses
actually committed.
The prevalent position among social scientists is that sex
offenders do have a greater tendency to repeat their acts than other
offenders.6 4 The statistical and psychological support for this theory
is stronger, though still not wholly satisfying.05
Granting, from the conflicting views of social scientists, that
sexual offenders have a greater tendency to repeat their acts than
nonsexual offenders, even the more favorable statistics would not
seem to illustrate a really strong tendency toward recidivism.06 It
would appear that no less than a probability that sexual offenders
repeat their acts could justify an evidentiary rule allowing admis-
sion of independent transactions to demonstrate a propensity to
commit sex crimes of the kind in issue. Moreover, an exception to
prove propensity to be applied alike to all sexual offenses would be
illogical, for social scientists agree that the tendency to repeat sexual
crimes varies materially with the particular type of offense in-
volved. 7
Indeed, only if it were certain that all sexual criminals were
recidivists would an exception to show propensity be warranted
considering the effect of admitting evidence for such a purpose on
the rights of the accused. Advocates of strict adherence to the inad-
missibility rule foresee prejudice to the accused as the inevitable
and undesirable consequence of relaxing it. If evidence of other
transactions is admitted, the defendant may be forced to meet
charges of which he had no notice. 8 He may thus be unable to refute
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Information obtained February 20, 1956, in an interview with Dr.
Bernard C. Glueck, Jr., Associate Professor of Psychiatry, University of
Minnesota, and former psychiatric consultant at Sing Sing Prison. This posi-
tion is reflected in the Report of the New York State Sex Delinquency Re-
search Committee, supra note 49. Dr. Glueck was a member of that Com-
mittee.
65. These studies are sometimes based on calculated estimates as to the
number of offenses committed by the subjects. See the Report of the New
York State Sex Delinquency Research Committee, supra note 49.
66. Ibid. Out of the 170 sex felons studied, only an estimated 35% were
chronic or consistent offenders and an estimated 32% were first offenders.
67. See 20 CALIFORNIA SEXUAL DEVIATION RESEARCH 27 (1954) ; RE-
PORT OF THE ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON SEX OFFENDERS 11 (1953); TAPIN,
THE HABrrUAL SEX OFFENDR 14 (1950).
68. See Commonwealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super. 328, 343-44, 116 A.
2d 867, 874 (1955) ; 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 194 (3d ed. 1940).
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fabricated charges.69 Of course, if the defendant has actually com-
mitted the other transactions, he may anticipate their introduction
and be prepared to meet them.7 In addition, proof of other trans-
actions diverts the attention of the jury from the offense in ques-
tion,7 1 and confuses them by raising collateral issues.72 Such evi-
dence may prompt the jury to feel justified in condemning the
accused, regardless of his guilt of the crime charged.73
It cannot be too strongly urged, ,that in an accusatorial system
of justice such as ours, the specific crime in issue must be the focal
point about which proof is to be marshalled. 74 To allow evidence of
other transactions to show depravity or a propensity to commit sexual
crimes is to predispose the minds of the jury to convict in an area
where prejudice already abounds,75 and is incongruous with a
system of justice which accords to a defendant extensive safeguards
of a fair trial.
V
Perhaps the remedy for the present trend toward liberal admissi-
bility is to adopt the rule proposed by the American Law Institute6
which provides:
"Evidence that a person committed a crime on a particular occa-
sion is inadmissible to prove that he committed a crime on an-
other occasion if, but only if, the evidence is relevant solely as
tending to prove his disposition to commit such a crime or to
commit crimes generally. 7 7
By utilizing standard exceptions, many courts have admitted evi-
dence of other transactions where the resulting prejudice for out-
weighed the probative value. Often this has involved mentally
stretching the exceptions to admit evidence not properly relevant
under them, or recognizing the relevancy of the evidence under an
exception although it was not introduced for that purpose. The
69. See note 68 supra.
70. Of course, a defendant may not be willing to confess similar trans-
actions to his counsel.
71. See Commonwealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super. 328, 344, 116 A. 2d
867, 874 (1955) ; 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 194 (3d ed. 1940).
72. See note 71 supra.
73. See note 71 supra.
74. See People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 292-93, 61 N. E. 286, 294
(1901).
75. See Note, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 608, 614 (1953)..
76. Model Code of Evidence rule 311 (1942). It is said that this was the
original rule in this country. See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar
Fact Evidence: America, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 988, 993-1000 (1938).
77. This is a paraphrase of the A. L. I. rule and is found in Common-
wealth v. Boulden, 179 Pa. Super. 328, 335, 116 A. 2d 867, 870 (1955).
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American Law Institute rule would eliminate the multitude of ex-
ceptions which have confused and undermined the present rule.
Supposedly it would remedy the anomalous situation in which
relevant evidence is excluded for want of an appropriate exception,
yet slightly relevant, highly prejudicial evidence is admitted.78 The
proposed rule is so vague, however, that it gives the trial judge
almost unlimited discretion to allow or deny admission, thus open-
ing the door to the same abuses to which the present rule is subject.
Perhaps the recent trend toward relaxation of the inadmissibility
rule is traceable to the response of the judiciary to public alarm over
the ever-increasing number of sex crimes.79 It is felt that handi-
capping the state in the prosecution of criminals is undesirable. It is
also likely that a realization of the difficulty of obtaining proof of
sexual offenses has been partially responsible for the trend.80
Continuance of the trend of liberal admissibility is almost cer-
tain to result in an increased number of convictions."" Though the
solution to the overall social problem of the sex offender lies in sex
education, therapy, law enforcement, and legislation, it may be
argued that conviction of accused sex criminals on the basis of other
transactions, admitted under liberal evidence rules, is a desirable
social end, since chronic sex offenders will at least be removed from
society to a place where they can do no harm and they may even
be rehabilitated through therapy. However, persons innocent of the
offenses charged against them may be convicted and it is difficult
to accede to the proposition that the judiciary may waive basic con-
stitutional rights in order to legislate desirable social ends.
78. Ibid. (by implication). Yet, as indicated previously, the rules as now
applied in some jurisdictions allow the courts to admit any evidence of other
transactions they care to.
79. See 39 Calif. L. Rev. 584, 587 (1951). Though there is an increasein the absolute number of sex crimes, there is evidence of a per capita de-
crease. See 20 California Sexual Deviation Research 26 (1954).
80. See 39 Calif. L. Rev. 584, 587 (1951).
81. See 23 Temp. L. Q. 133, 135 (1949).
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